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Abstract
The report analyzes the drivers of different forms of migration. Specifically, using
Eurostat data on new residence permits issued by EU countries to Third-Country Na-
tionals, we are able to distinguish among five channels of entry and stay in Europe:
family, work-related, education, humanitarian, and other reasons. We estimate
several panel data gravity models for each of the groups of migrants, for the period
2008-2015. We find that geographical and cultural bilateral variables influence all
forms of migration similarly. We provide evidence of network effects, especially for
the groups of family and work-related migrants. Population growth in the country of
origin is negatively associated with migration, except for the group corresponding
to the humanitarian channel of entry into the EU. Increasing economic disparities
between the origin and the destination countries, measured with GDP per-capita,
are associated with higher migration movements, though not for all the groups.
Restrictive migration policies in the destination country and travel visa restrictions
seem to act as a deterrent for migration.
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1. Introduction
There does not exist an exhaustive theory of the reasons determining migrations.
International wage differences, net of migration costs, are considered as the main
drivers of economic migration (Bodvarsson and Van Den Berg, 2009). However,
these disparities between countries might not be decisive in influencing non-economic
migrations. This could be the case for individuals moving for family, education, or
humanitarian motives. Similarly, a comprehensive empirical analysis of the deter-
minants of different forms of migration does not exist. This report explores the
above research gap at the empirical level, addressing the following question. What
is the relative weight of international migration drivers for different migrant groups?
Migration movements of Third-Country Nationals (TCNs) to Europe constitute the
focus of the analysis. Indeed, EU policy makers are currently in need of a deeper
understanding of the drivers of migration forms for better migration governance
in the medium-term. Moreover, identifying the determinants of migration for the
different groups of migrants is necessary to design policies targeted at each of the
groups.
To identify different forms of migration, we use Eurostat data on residence per-
mits which contain information on the legal channels to enter and reside in Europe.
Specifically, data allow us to distinguish among five reasons of entry and stay in
the EU: family reasons (i.e. family formation or reunification), work-related rea-
sons, education purposes (e.g. the case of students admitted to higher education
courses), humanitarian reasons (such as refugees or individuals granted subsidiary
protection, victims of human trafficking, unaccompanied minors), and other rea-
sons (e.g. retirees). Interestingly, Eurostat data are bilateral, i.e. they contain
information on the number of new residence permits issued by EEA countries (plus
Switzerland) to TCNs of any citizenship, from 2008 to 2015. Data constraints consti-
tute the main limitation to the study of different migration forms. Indeed, bilateral
data on international migration inflows are aggregated and do not allow differenti-
ating among groups of migrants. Hence, the main novelty of this report is that we
address this issue using data of residence permits disaggregated by reason. How-
ever, as it will be detailed in the next section, some cautiousness is needed when
using residence permits as a proxy for migration inflows.
We estimate several specifications of panel data gravity models using bilateral res-
idence permits data for each of the five mentioned groups of migrants, separately.
The results of this report suggest that dyadic variables (i.e. geographical and cul-
tural) affect all the groups, with geographical distance acting as deterrent of mi-
gration especially for family migrants. Networks established through past migration
play an important role in determining migration movements, especially for family
and work-related migrants. Population growth in the country of origin is negatively
associated with migrations of all the groups, except for the one of humanitarian
migrants. The role of variables measuring the economic conditions in the countries
of origin and destination is also explored. Increasing disparities in GDP per-capita
between the origin and the destination countries are associated with higher migra-
tion movements between pairs of countries. This holds for all groups, except for
the humanitarian one. However, such relation is not confirmed in all the sensitivity
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analyses. We also seek evidence of the role of migration policies and travel visa
restrictions in shaping migration patterns. For instance, we find that a relatively
low strictness of family reunification policies in the destination country is associated
with higher number of residence permits issued for family reasons. Travel visa re-
strictions seem to act as an obstacle to migration movements for all migrant groups.
Finally, we perform sensitivity analysis using the Poisson model to address the prob-
lem of the presence of observations of residence permits equal to zero for several
country-pairs. The sensitivity analysis suggests that the inclusion of zero-residence
permit observations does not alter most of the results. Overall, our analysis con-
firms that drivers of human mobility do not have the same influence for all forms of
migration. Hence, it is crucial to study separately each of the migrant groups.
Data limitations have prevented an extensive analysis of the drivers of different
forms and channels of migration. Indeed, international migration inflows data are
normally aggregated. However, there are some notable exceptions. For instance,
for the education channel, Beine et al. (2014) study the determinants of the mobility
of international students. Using data on students from UNESCO, OECD and EURO-
STAT, they find that previous networks of high-skilled migrants positiveley influence
student mobility. The cost of living in the country of destination and the quality
of universities are also attractors of foreign students. For the family channel, the
empirical literature investigating the drivers of migration is scant. Among the few
exceptions, Nivalainen (2004) analyzes the pattern of migration of Finnish house-
holds. His results indicate that family migration movements are mainly motivated
by the the husbands' need to move abroad for career related reason. There is a
wide recognition that migration for humanitarian reasons is driven by non-economic
considerations. Moreover, the profile of asylum seekers and refugees is generally
different from the one of economic-migrants (Dustmann et al., 2016). However, to
the best of our knowledge, a deep analysis of the determinants of such complex
forms of migration has not been carried-out yet.
From the methodological perspective, we contribute to the literature employing
panel data gravity models to identify the economic and non-economic drivers of
bilateral migration movements at the macro-level (for recent reviews on gravity
models on migration, see Beine et al., 2016; Ramos, 2016). Indeed, we find that
these drivers differ and weigh differently for the various migration forms. Hence,
our results point out the need to analyze them separately.
The remainder of the report is organized as follows: Section 2 illustrates data on
residence permits and shows some facts and figures based on such data. Section 3
contains the empirical analysis and the main regression results. Robustness checks




Our analysis is based on the Eurostat residence permits database, available for the
period 2008-2015. Data contain yearly information on the number of first residence
permits, i.e. any authorization issued to a TCN for the first time allowing the TCN to
stay legally in Europe1. Importantly, data are bilateral: in other words, they record
the number of residence permits issued to TCNs of any non-EU citizenship by any
given European country2. Data include information on the length of the validity of
the residence permit3. For our analysis, we use residence permits with validity of
at least 12 months. This is for consistency with the United Nations definition of
long-term migrants, i.e. individuals moving their usual residence to another coun-
try for at least a year4. Even more importantly, permits are classified according to
the reasons for their issuance. Such reasons indicate the regular channels to enter
and reside in Europe. Five main categories (reasons) can be distinguished: family,
occupation, education, humanitarian, and other reasons5.
The category of family includes permits issued for family formation or reunifica-
tion. These permits are granted to spouses, children, and other family components
joining either a TCN or an EU-citizen family member6. Moreover, individuals who
join their family and also obtain the permission to work are recorded in the family
category. The channel of occupation is broad and consists of permits issued to high-
skilled workers, holders of EU-Blue Card, researchers7, seasonal and other migrant
workers who have obtained an authorization to work in a given European country.
Residence permits for education reasons are granted to students, i.e. individuals
admitted to any full-time higher education course. Additionally, those permits are
given to unremunerated trainees, volunteers, school pupils8. The group of humani-
tarian residence permits is also broad and heterogeneous. Indeed, it includes TCNs
who obtain subsidiary protection, refugees, unaccompanied minors, and victims
of human trafficking. These statuses are recognized by the European regulation9.
TCNs who obtain a residence permit for other humanitarian reasons as defined by
national laws (and not necessarily harmonized across countries) are comprised in
1According to Eurostat definition, first permits include also renewed permits granted to the same
individual for the same reason. To be considered as first, the validity of the new permit has to start
at least six months after the cessation of the validity of the old permit. For further details, please see
Eurostat (2015).
2Precisely, European Economic Area countries (EEA) and Switzerland.
3Three types of permits can be identified: validity between 3 and 5 months, validity between 6 and
11 months, validity equal to or greater than 12 months.
4See Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration, Revision 1 (1998), United Nations
5It should be noticed that the five reasons listed here do not exactly correspond to the ones defined
by Eurostat. Indeed, here we split Eurostat category "Other" into two categories, i.e. humanitarian and
other.
6These two sub-cases are regulated by the Family Reunification Directive 2003/86/EC and by the
Directive 2004/38/EC, respectively. Individuals receiving a permit for family-related reasons according
to the national legislations are also included in the category of family (Eurostat, 2015).
7The categories of high-skilled workers and EU-Blue Card holders are defined in Directive 2009/50/EC,
while researchers in Directive 2005/71/EC.
8The definitions and the regulation of the different channels of entry for education reasons fall under
the Directive 2004/114/EC.
9Specifically, they fall under the regulation of Directive 2004/83/EC and Directive 2004/81/EC.
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the humanitarian channel. Finally, the residual category, other, is composed by in-
dividuals who are granted residence only (e.g. retirees who simply intend to live in
European countries, without any other reasons as family reunification), plus other
not specified motives.
The main advantage of analysing migration of TCNs using residence permits rather
than bilateral migration flows data is the opportunity to identify the different chan-
nels of entry and stay in Europe. In fact, migration flows data, commonly used
and analysed in the literature, are aggregated. Thus, they do not allow to distin-
guish among different forms of migration. This particular characteristic of residence
permits data allows to identify whether the key drivers of migration hold true for
all the categories and whether they exert the same influence for immigrants com-
ing for different motives10. Do the channels to obtain residence permits mirror
the real motive to enter the EU? When examining first residence permits data, we
can provide a positive answer to this question. Indeed, a first permit is issued to
an individual for the first time, hence it reflects the actual motive of the migrant's
admission to the EU. It should also be mentioned that TCNs are allowed to renew
their residence permit and to change its status (e.g. change from education to
work-related permit). However, since we treat residence permits as a proxy for
migration inflows, we are interested in the status of the residence permit at the
time of a TCN's entry into the EU, rather than in its evolution over time. It should
also be noticed that the implementation of residence permits data collection might
still differ among countries. Therefore, while data comparability between years is
guaranteed, some cautiousness is needed for their cross-country comparability (for
details see Eurostat, 2015)11. Despite this issue, residence permits data, until now
largely unexplored, have the potential to shed light on the evolution of several forms
of migration in the EU and on their corresponding determinants.
2.2 Facts and figures
A first look at residence permits data reveals that the absolute number of first
permits issued by EEA countries and Switzerland ranges between 1.3 and almost
2.1 million over the period 2008-2015. After the reduction of issued permits taking
place from 2008 to 2012, a slight increase can be observed again in more recent
years (see Figure 1 below). In 2015, the majority of first permits is issued for
family reasons, which represent 41 percent of total permits. Lower shares can
be observed for education and work-related reasons, which account for 19 and 15
percent of total permits in the same year, respectively (see Figure 2). Regarding
the remaining two channels of entry, the "other reasons" channel barely reaches 14
percent of total permits, while the humanitarian one is below 10 percent in 2015
and does not display a dramatic increase over the period 2008-2015 (see Figure
10It should be noticed that residence permits data have to be considered as a proxy of migration flows
with caution. Indeed, as explained before, first permits could also contain individuals already living in
the country, whose old permit was expired at least six months before the issuing of the new permit for
the same reason.
11A minor data concern is related to the possible abuse of the legal channels to entry the EU. For
instance, a TCNs can enter through the education channel, and then stay in the EU for anotehr reason,
e.g. for work-related motives. Besides anecdotal evidence, the real size of this phenomenon is unknown.
7
3). Instead, permits for work-related, family and education reasons exhibit more
variation over time. In particular, permits for work are generally declining from
2010 and remain quite stable after that year. Family and education related permits
decrease from 2010 to 2012 and start to slightly increase thereafter (see Figure 3
below).
Figure 1: Residence permits issued by EEA countries and Switzerland. Years: 2008-2015.
Notes: Source: own calculation based on Eurostat residence permits data. Only residence permits with
validity of at least 12 months are included.
Figure 2: Residence permits issued by EEA countries and Switzerland, by reason. Year: 2015.
Notes: Source: own calculation based on Eurostat residence permits data. Eurostat category "Other"
here is split into "humanitarian" and "other" categories. Only residence permits with validity of at least
12 months are included.
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Figure 3: Residence permits issued by EEA countries and Switzerland, by reason. Years: 2008-2015.
Notes: Source: own calculation based on Eurostat residence permits data. Eurostat category "Other"
here is split into "Humanitarian" and "Other" categories. Only residence permits with validity of at least
12 months are included.
When breaking down residence permits by destination, we can observe an uneven
distribution among EEA countries. In 2015, Great Britain has issued the highest
value, in absolute numbers, of residence permits (451 thousand permits). It is
followed by France, Spain, Germany, Italy, and Sweden, that issue a considerably
lower number of permits (approximately 200 thousand each for the same year. See
Figure 4 below). Figure 5 shows that the bulk of residence permits in Great Britain is
issued for education and other reasons. Instead, in the other top five destinations,
family is the largest channel of entry.
Similarly, residence permits can be disaggregated by origin country, i.e. by the
citizenship of TCNs obtaining the permit. Figure 6 plots the number of residence
permits and shows the top sending TCNs in 2015, with United States in the highest
position. China, Syria, India, and Morocco follow. Further break down by reason
of entry (see Figure 7) suggests that in 2015 the majority of United States citizens
obtained residence permits for other reasons, wherease Chinese citizens entered
and stayed in Europe mostly for education reasons.
Finally, we can break down residence permits by destination, origin, and reason.
Figure 8 represents the dis-aggregation along these three dimensions in 2015. The
same patterns emerge: Great Britain is the country issuing the biggest volume of
residence permits, mostly to citizens of the United State (for other reasons), of India
(for occupation and family reasons) and of China (for education reasons). Overall,
the family reason was the prevalent channel in 2015.
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Figure 4: Residence permits by EEA and Switzerland (or destination countries). Year: 2015.
Notes: Source: own calculation based on Eurostat residence permits data. Only residence permits with
validity of at least 12 months are included.
Figure 5: Residence permits in top destination countries, by reason. Year: 2015.
Notes: Source: own calculation based on Eurostat residence permits data. Eurostat category "Other"
here is split into "Humanitarian" and "Other" categories. Only residence permits with validity of at least
12 months are included.
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Figure 6: Residence permits by origin country. Year: 2015.
Notes: Source: own calculation based on Eurostat residence permits data. Only residence permits with
validity of at least 12 months are included. EUROSTAT data on residence permits.
Figure 7: Residence permits in top origin countries, by reason. Year: 2015.
Notes: Source: own calculation based on Eurostat residence permits data. Eurostat category "Other"
here is split into "humanitarian" and "other" categories. Only residence permits with validity of at least
12 months are included.
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Figure 8: Residence permits by origin and destination countries. Year: 2015.
Notes: Source: own calculation based on Eurostat residence permits data. Eurostat category "Other"
here is split into "humanitarian" and "other" categories. Only residence permits with validity of at least
12 months are included.
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3. Determinants of migration: evidence from residence
permits data
3.1 Empirical specification
The objective of this report is to identify the drivers of inflows of TCNs into the EU
using bilateral residence permits, i.e. data containing information on permits issued
by European countries to citizens of any third-country nationality. We follow the
gravity approach commonly used to seek empirical evidence of the determinants of





= β0 + β1ln(dist)od + β2contigod + β3colonyod + β4com.langod +
+β5com.legod + β6ln(migrstock)odt−1 + β7ln(earn)dt−1 + β8ln(GDPcpt.rat)odt +
+β9ln(pop.grt)ot + ct + co + cd + odt,
where t = 2008, ..., 2015, o indicates 161 Third-Countries, d 31 EEA countries and
Switzerland. For details about the data, please see Table 4 in the Appendix. The
dependent variable, ResPerodtPopot , is the ratio of first residence permits (with duration of
at least 12 months) issued by country d to TCNs with citizenship from country o, in
year t, and the population of country o. As it is common in gravity equations, we in-
clude a set of dyadic geographical and cultural variables: the distance between the
capital of country o and d, ln(dist)od, and a control for whether they are neighbour,
contigod. colonyod is a dummy variable indicating whether there has been a colo-
nial relationship between o and d. com.lanod and com.legod control for the presence
of common language and legal system, respectively. To control for the network ef-
fects, we use the stock of migrants from origin o residing in country d in the previous
year, ln(migrstock)odt−1. To capture the difference of economic conditions between
the country of origin and the destination, we introduce the ratio between o and d of
GDP per-capita, in natural logarithm, i.e. ln(GDPcpt.rat)odt. As economic variable,
we also include the net earnings in the destination country, ln(earn)dt. First, it should
be noticed that earnings are lagged by one year to mitigate the possible issue of
reverse causality (i.e. the influence exerted by migrants on earnings in the des-
tination country. See, for instance, Mayda, 2010). Unfortunately, comprehensive
and comparable data on net earnings for all the Third-Countries do not exist, hence
we cannot control for the earnings at the origin. As demographic variable, we use
the population growth in the origin country, ln(popgrt)ot. We include time dummies
to control for the yearly shocks common to all countries. We also introduce desti-
nation and regional origin dummies12 to control for the time-invariant unobserved
heterogeneity.
The model is estimated using least squares dummy variables. We run three sets of
regressions, separately. In the first set, we use total residence permits. In other
words, the dependent variable consists of all permits, independently of the reason
for their issuance. In the second set of estimations, we run regressions separately
for each of the five groups of reasons (family, education, work, humanitarian, and
12Since we have 160 origin countries, we group origins into-macro regions and include regional dum-
mies. In this way, we avoid to lose a non-negligible number of degrees of freedom. Using regional
dummies, we are also able to gain additional variation. However, we also present one of the specifica-
tions including all the origin dummies.
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other). We then compare the estimated coefficients and we test whether they are
statistically different between groups. Indeed, our aim is to investigate whether
the key drivers of migration patterns in EU, here measured through residence per-
mits, differ according to the forms and motives for migrating. In the third group
of regressions, we include controls for travel visa restrictions and migration poli-
cies. These regressions are run separately from the previous ones. Indeeed, the
policy indicators cover only specific policies (e.g. strictness of family reunification
policies), hence they are included only in the regressions for the groups affected by
such measures. In Section 4, we run several robustness checks. For the sensitivity
analysis, we estimate a Poisson regression model for count data. Indeed, residence
permits contain non-negligible number of zero observations, especially the ones
disaggregated by reason. Moreover, we present additional specifications including
different economic controls for the origin and the destination countries.
3.2 Total residence permits
The first set of regressions using total residence permits is shown in Table 1. The
results confirm the findings of the literature which analyzes the determinants of
international migration using bilateral aggregate migration rates data (see, for in-
tance, Beine et al., 2016). Indeed, networks of previous migrants, geographic, and
cultural bilateral variables are crucial in determining bilateral migration patterns.
For instance, a 1 percent increase in the stock of previous migrants with the same
citizenship is associated with an increase of bilateral residence permits ranging from
1.6 to 1.9 percent. Differences in economic conditions between origin and destina-
tion countries, measured through the ratio of GDP per-capita between origin and
destination, positively affect the dependent variable. This means that increasing
differences of GDP per-capita between the origin and the destination are associated
with higher inflows of TCNs. Net earnings in the destination country are not sig-
nificant (see specification 2, Table 1). The population growth in the origin country
is negatively associated with the dependent variable (see specification 4). How-
ever, when all origin dummies are included, the coefficient loses significance (see
specification 5).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln dist. −0.905∗∗∗ −0.905∗∗∗ −1.087∗∗∗ −0.991∗∗∗ −0.735∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.091) (0.088) (0.091) (0.130)
contig. 0.083 0.083 −0.160 −0.157 0.111
(0.318) (0.318) (0.356) (0.350) (0.237)
colony 1.007∗∗∗ 1.007∗∗∗ 1.059∗∗∗ 1.110∗∗∗ 0.996∗∗∗
(0.353) (0.353) (0.358) (0.359) (0.223)
com. lang. 1.275∗∗∗ 1.275∗∗∗ 1.228∗∗∗ 1.196∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗∗
(0.171) (0.171) (0.161) (0.158) (0.107)
com. leg. 0.364∗∗∗ 0.364∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗ 0.502∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.091) (0.065)
ln migr. stockt−1 0.198∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015)
ln(earn)dt−1 −0.130 0.300∗∗∗
(0.1952) (0.027)
ln(GDPcpt.rat)odt 0.314∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ −0.554∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.027) (0.132)
pop. grt.ot −0.173∗∗∗ −0.014
(0.024) (0.015)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Destination dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Origin regional dummies yes yes yes yes no
Origin dummies no no no no yes
R2 0.557 0.558 0.588 0.595 0.775
Obs 14289 14287 13827 13827 13827
Notes: 10%, 5% and 1% levels of confidence indicated by ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ respectively. Robust standard errors clustered
at the country-pair level.
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3.3 Residence permits by reason
In the second set of regressions, we use first residence permits data disaggregated
by reason for issuing the permit. We estimate the same specification as the one in
column 4, Table 1. The results are reported in Table 2. The following main facts
emerge: first, the dyadic variables (i.e. geographical distance and contiguity be-
tween country pairs, the presence of colonial ties, common language, and common
legal system between the origin and the destination) influence all channels of mi-
gration. In particular, geographical distance is negative and significant for all the
groups. Additionally, when comparing the estimated coefficients of the distance, we
find that they are statistically different between groups. For instance, the coefficient
for the group family is higher and statistically different from the ones of education,
work-related, and other groups. Instead, it is not statistically different from the
one of the humanitarian group13. In other words, geographical distance is found to
exert a higher influence on the movements of family migrants rather than on the
other groups.
Interestingly, we can observe that the relation between migrant networks and res-
idence permits remains positive and significant only for the groups of family and
occupation (see Table 2). Moreover, when performing the test as before, we find
that the coefficients of the network effects are statistically different between the
two groups. Family migrants are the most affected by the presence of previous
migrant communities. This suggests that networks are more important for family
migrants rather than for individuals migrated for work-related reasons. This could
be due to the fact that most EU countries have demand-driven labour migration
systems (Czaika and Parsons, 2009). This means that a TCN needs either the spon-
sor of an employer or a job-offer to be eligible for a work-related residence permit.
Hence, migrant workers might not necessarily need the support of previous migrant
communities to find a job. Networks might simply act as facilitator of their migra-
tion movements. Instead, the role of network is crucial for family migrants. For
instance, previous communities might reduce migration costs for new immigrants,
provide them with information about the life conditions in the destination countries,
support their possible job search after they have entered the EU as family migrants.
Surprisingly, the positive network effect disappears for the other groups.
As for the total residence permits, the GDP per-capita ratio is positive and sig-
nificant for all the groups, except for the humanitarian one. Indeed, for the latter
it becomes negative and significant. This means that an increasing disparity in
economic conditions between the origin and the destination is associated with de-
creasing residence permits for humanitarian reasons. Finally, population growth in
the origin country is negatively associated with residence permits for all categories
except for the humanitarian one. Strictly speaking, population growth in a given
year is driven either by the excess of births over deaths, or by positive net migra-
tion14, or both. Hence, we can interpret the result as follows. In countries where
population growth is driven by excess of births, an increasing number of new-borns
13Specifically, we perform a Chow test to check whether the estimated coefficient of one group is equal
to the estimated coefficient of another group. We repeat the test for each of the estimated coefficients,
comparing two groups at a time. This results in ten tests for each of the regressors. Hence, due to space
constraints, the test statistics are not reported here.
14In case of positive net migration, immigration is higher than emigration.
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might discourage individuals' mobility. Indeed, the presence of a new-born might
make mobility difficult. In countries where population growth is mainly driven by
positive net migration the issue of reverse causality may arise. Indeed, popula-
tion changes in the origin country could be influenced by the country's migration
dynamics. To mitigate this issue, we also run regressions using population growth
lagged by one year. These specifications confirm the negative relationship between
population growth in the country of origin and the number of residence permits.
Summing up, the analysis of residence permits disaggregated by reasons reveals
that there are some differences in the drivers of migration among groups. Impor-
tantly, distance and migrant networks weight more for family migrants rather than
for all the other groups. Increasing economic disparities between the origin and
the destination increases migration movements for all groups, except that for the
humanitarian one. Despite the cautiousness needed when distinguishing among
several migrants' groups due to the data caveats explained in the previous section,
the results confirm that migration drivers weight differently for each of the groups.





(FAM) (EDUC) (WORK) (HUMAN) (OTH)
ln dist. −1.108∗∗∗ −0.764∗∗∗ −0.876∗∗∗ −1.003∗∗∗ −0.691∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.047) (0.049) (0.082) (0.057)
contig. −0.317∗ −0.298 −0.267 −1.436∗∗∗ 0.555∗∗
(0.192) (0.197) (0.212) (0.360) (0.220)
colony 1.224∗∗∗ 1.898∗∗∗ 1.177∗∗∗ 0.942∗∗∗ 1.311∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.112) (0.123) (0.174) (0.130)
com. lang. 1.188∗∗∗ 1.084∗∗∗ 1.201∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗ 0.917∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.074) (0.087) (0.113) (0.088)
com. leg. 0.299∗∗∗ 0.539∗∗∗ 0.583∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.045) (0.046) (0.073) (0.051)
ln migr. stockt−1 0.142∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.031∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009)
ln(GDPcpt.rat)odt 0.270∗∗∗ 0.438∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗ −0.123∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.0160) (0.017) (0.030) (0.020)
ln(pop. grt)ot −0.193∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗ −0.189∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ −0.065∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.028) (0.018)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Destination dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Origin regional dummies yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.586 0.462 0.524 0.284 0.465
Obs 11907 0.462 8765 5548 7330
10%, 5% and 1% levels of confidence indicated by ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ respectively.
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3.4 The role of policies
In this sub-section, we investigate whether policies in the destination country and
travel visa requirements influence the patterns of residence permits. It should firstly
be noticed that policies are quite stable over time. Additionally, in our analysis we
use a relatively short panel (i.e. 8 years, from 2008 to 2015). Hence, policies
which do not display changes over time, cultural and institutional factors (such as
the country level of bureaucracy and efficiency), and other unobservable time in-
variant characteristics of the destination countries are captured by the destination
fixed effects.
To analyse the role of policies, we use the Migrant Integration Policy Index (Mipex),
which indicates the extent to which migration and integration policies are restric-
tive or favorable for migrants. Specifically, the Mipex includes several indicators
and sub-indicators which capture the strictness of different policy dimensions. It
should be noticed that even though the Mipex index is commonly used to measure
integration policies, we select those Mipex sub-indicators which proxy admission
and migration policies. For instance, the index mipexfamily, is a composite indicator
measuring whether legally resident foreign citizens have a facilitated right to reunite
in their families (e.g. like nationals or EU citizens who move from one Member State
to another)15. This indicator is built including several aspects such as eligibility con-
ditions to obtain the the status of family reunification, the security of the status, and
the rights associated with such status). It takes values from 0 to 100, with higher
values indicating a more favorable or less restrictive policy. In the regressions for
the family group, we use the lagged indicator since the role of policies in influencing
the issuance of residence permits might not be instantaneaous (for details about the
Mipex, please see Table 4 in the Appendix). In the regressions for the group of occu-
pation we include the mipex occup indicator. This measures whether legally-resident
foreign citizens have comparable workers' rights and opportunities like nationals to
access jobs and improve their skills. As before, it is based on several dimensions,
such as the access to the labour market and to general and targeted support (such
as public employment services)16. The results of the regression including the Mipex
indicators are reported in Table 3. The coefficient of the lagged family indicator is
positive and significant for the family group. Hence, more favorable and spportive
family reuniufication policies are associated with higher residence permits for family
reasons. Similarly, the coefficient of mipex occupdt−1 is positive and significant. In
other words, a labour market supporting immigrants and where TCNs have similar
rights as to the ones of native workers tends to be associated with more residence
permits for occupation.
As a final step we introduce a dummy variable for travel visa requirements. In
our analysis we use Visa Network data (see Table 4 in the appendix) from Mau et
al. (2015). Their database contains information on whether a given destination im-
poses pre-arrival visa restrictions (such as passports or heatlh requirements) to any
15http://mipex.eu/
16It should be noticed that the Mipex also includes a general indicator for Education. However, we do
not include it in the regression for the group of education since it measures the extent to which migrants'
children are encouraged to achieve in schools as the nartionals and education support measures are
targeted at them. Hence, the index does not refer to researchers and students' admitted to higher
education courses, as the ones included in residence permits data.
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given TCNs in 1969 and in 2010 (i.e. visaod is a dummy equal to one if restrictions
are in place). We use data for 2010 and, due to data constraints, we assume that
bilateral visa are constant over the period considered (i.e. we use the dummy for
2010 for all the years in our analysis, 2008-2015). We estimate the model using
total residence permits. Indeed, all migration movements, independently of their
form, might be influenced by travel restrictions. From the results, we can observe
that the coefficient of visa is negative and statistically significant at 5 percent level
(see the third column of Table 3). Bilateral visa restrictions are negatively associ-
ated with the total residence permits. However, it could be argued that travel visa
restrictions do not have any direct influence on the number of residence permits
since they constitute a restriction to travels, rather than to migration. Hence, this
results simply hints that travel visa restrictions might represent a cost for moving
from a given TCN origin to any EU destination. Even if in an indirect way, they may
act as a disincentive to migration movements.
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ln dist. −1.133∗∗∗ −0.886∗∗∗ −0.967∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.118) (0.092)
contig. −0.422 −0.194 −0.173
(0.346) (0.504) (0.354)
colony 1.330∗∗∗ 1.187∗∗∗ 1.110∗∗∗
(0.376) (0.398) (0.359)
com. lang. 1.163∗∗∗ 1.194∗∗∗ 1.186∗∗∗
(0.173) (0.177) (0.158)
com. leg. 0.303∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗ 0.487∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.116) (0.091)
ln migr. stockt−1 0.143∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.015) (0.013)
ln(GDPcpt.rat)odt 0.271∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.038) (0.029)








Year dummies yes yes yes
Destination dummies yes yes yes
Origin regional dummies yes yes yes
R2 0.589 0.522 0.595
Obs 11035 8716 13827
10%, 5% and 1% levels of confidence indicated by ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ respectively.




As a sensitivity analysis, we run several alternative specifications to check the ro-
bustness of the results. Firstly, we estimate a Poisson model for count data, using
the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator (PPML) as in Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006 and 2010. The results are shown in Table 5 in the Appendix). The
Poisson model allows to take into account the presence of observations of residence
permits which are equal to zero for some of the country-pairs. Such observations
are dropped when using OLS, with the dependent variable in logarithm. Hence, we
check whether the results are sensitive to the inclusion of observations equal to
zero, included in level in the Poisson model. This is especially important for the hu-
manitarian group. Indeed, residence permits issued to citizens of a given TCN origin
by any given EU destination equal to zero reach 60 percent of the total country-pairs
for this group.
The estimation results from the Poisson model confirm the results for the geo-
graphical, cultural and demographic variables (except than for the common legal
system variable, which is not significant anymore). Some differences emerge for
the migrants stocks and for the GDP per-capita ratio. The coefficient of the network
effects is still positive and significant for the family and work-related migrants. In-
stead, differently from the main specifications, the network effects become positive
and significant for the humanitarian group. The results for the economic variable,
i.e. the GDP per-capita ratio, display some differences from the main specifications.
Indeed, the GDP per-capita ratio is positive and significant only for the education
group. Higher economic differences between the origin and the destination coun-
tries are associated with higher number of residence permits for education reasons.
We also run speicifications including the logarithm of GDP-per capita in the origin
and in the destination countries separately, and their squared terms. However, the
coefficients of GDP-per capita are not always significant. Moreover, we do not find
any evidence supporting the so called migration-hump (i.e. the inverse U-shape
relationship between economic development and emigration. See, for instance,
Clemens 2014)17. The Poisson regression for the humanitarian group confirms the
negative sign of the GDP per-capita ratio for the humanitarian group. Finally, the
coefficients of the population growth continues to be negative and significant as in
the main specifications. In conclusion, except for the economic variable, the inclu-
sion of observations equal to zero does not alter the results.
4.2 Alternative specifications
Since the Poisson model seems to suggest that GDP-per capita ratio coefficient is
not fully robust, we also run alternative specifications using as economic indicators
the natural logarithm of the employment rate in the origin and in the destination
country. When using total residence permits the employment rate at origin is nega-
17These alternative specifications are not reported here for simplicity, but they are available upon
request to the Authors.
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tively associated with the depedent variable, while the coefficient of the employment
rate at destination is positive and significant, both for the OLS and for the PPML es-
timations. This means that favorable labour market conditions in the destination
country, measured through the employment rate, tend to attract migrants. Simi-
larly, increasing employment rates in the country of origin are associated with less
migration movements, i.e. they tend to retain individuals in the origin. These re-
sults are confirmed for the group of family, in both estimations. Instead, for the
group of workers, only the employment rate at destination is significant. Higher
employment rates are related to the issuance of more residence permits for work-
related reasons. Instead, for the humanitarian migrants, only the employment rates
at destination is negative and significant, in both the OLS and the PPML estimations
(The results are shown in Table 6 and Table 7 in the Appendix).
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5. Concluding remarks
The report provides the first empirical evidence on the determinants of different
forms of migration to Europe. Dyadic variables (such as geographical and cultural)
influence in a similar way all migration forms, i.e. work-related, family, education
and humanitarian migrations. Instead, network effects, economic, and demographic
variables exert their influence on migration forms in different ways. Overall, the
presence of previous migrant communities is positively associated with migration
for family and work-related reasons. Population growth in the country of origin is
negatively associated with migration movements of all groups, except for the hu-
manitarian one. The role of economic variables in influencing migration movements
is less clear cut. Growing disparities in GDP per-capita between the origin and the
destination are associated with higher migration for work-related, family, education
reasons. However, the results are not confirmed by all the sensitivity analyses. This
would require further investigation of the role of economic disparities in influencing
different forms of migration, measured through residence permits. When looking at
the employment rates in the origin and in the destination countries, we find more
robust results. Higher employment rates at destinations are associated with larger
family and work-related migration. Instead, higher employment rate in the origin
country discourages migration for the groups of family and humanitarian. Finally,
restrictive migration policies, such as the ones imposing constraints and strict eli-
gibility criteria to family reunification, tend to be associated with lower numbers of
residence permits.
Other obstacles and facilitators of migration movements could be taken into ac-
count. For instance, we have neglected the role of conflicts or political instability
in the origin country for the group of humanitarian migrants. Additionally, resi-
dence permits data could be further disaggregated by looking at the sub-groups
of migrants comprised in each of the five categories. For instance, the group of
unaccompanied children included among humanitarian migrants could be analyzed
separately. All these possible developments are left as subjects for further research.
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6. Appendix
Table 4: Data: description and sources.
Variable Definition Source
Dependent Variable:
ResPerodt First Residence Permits Eurostat, Residence permits database
Variables: migr_resfirst, migr_resoth
Popot Total population World Bank, WDI
Variable: SP.POP.TOTL
Dyadic Variables:
distod Distance between capitals CEPII
contigod Contiguous countries (dummy) CEPII
colonyod Colonial link (dummy) CEPII
com.langod Common official language (dummy) CEPII
com.legod Common legal system (dummy) CEPII
Migrant networks:
migrstockodt−1 Migrant Population Eurostat, Migration and citizenship database
by citizenship Variable: migr_pop1ctz
Economic Variables:
earndt−1 Net earn. (single person, without children) Eurostat, Earnings database
Variable: earn_nt_net
GDP pct GDP per-capita (constant 2010$) World Bank, WDI
Variable: NY.GDP.MKTP.KD
Empl. rate Empl. rate (% tot. lab. force) World Bank, WDI
Variable: SL.EMP.1524.SP.FE.ZS
Demographic Variables:
pop.grtot Population growth World Bank, WDI
Variable: SP.POP.GROW
Policy Variables:
visaodt Pre-arrival travel visa restrictions Mau et al. (2015)
Years: 1969, 2010; EEA countries and CHE
mipexdt−1 Migrant Integration Policy Index MIPEX; Years: 2007-2014; EU28
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(TOT) (FAM) (EDUC) (WORK) (HUMAN) (OTH)
ln dist. −1.373∗∗∗ −1.749∗∗∗ −0.944∗ −0.972∗∗∗ −0.604∗∗ −1.325∗∗∗
(0.283) (0.321) (0.533) (0.271) (0.273) (0.299)
contig. −0.642∗ −1.033∗ −0.431 −0.425 −1.162 −0.393
(0.356) (0.553) (0.601) (0.324) (1.138) (0.604)
colony 1.734∗∗ 2.187∗∗∗ 2.809∗∗∗ 1.108 1.945∗∗∗ −0.377
(0.710) (0.840) (0.294) (0.773) (0.620) (0.448)
com. lang. 1.671∗∗∗ 1.317∗∗ 2.143∗∗∗ 2.359∗∗∗ −0.310 2.258∗∗∗
(0.485) (0.537) (0.493) (0.689) (0.571) (0.518)
com. leg. −0.119 −0.374 0.174 0.602∗ 0.212 −0.065
(0.261) (0.298) (0.259) (0.329) (0.308) (0.324)
ln migr. stockt−1 0.157∗∗∗ 0.133∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.074) (0.023) (0.052) (0.064) (0.047)
ln(GDPcpt.rat)odt −0.072 0.030 0.365∗ −0.371∗ −0.303∗∗ −0.102
(0.107) (0.094) (0.204) (0.196) (0.132) (0.181)
ln(pop. grt)ot −0.550∗∗∗ −0.531∗∗∗ −0.502∗∗∗ −0.700∗∗∗ 0.066 −0.739∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.114) (0.131) (0.123) (0.078) (0.172)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Destination dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Origin regional dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
RESET test, p-value 0.040 0.472 0.009 0.000 0.916 0.000
R2 0.511 0.412 0.716 0.464 0.099 0.738
Obs 17743 17885 17881 17748 17762 17878
10%, 5% and 1% levels of confidence indicated by ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the country-pair
level. Test statistics of the RESET test are reported. Specifically, the RESET is implemented including the square of the vector of the
estimated parameters in the regression and checking its significance as in Santos Silva and Tenereryos, (2006). The null hypothesis
is that the coefficient of this additional regressor is equal to zero. Rejecting the null hypothesis means that the model suffers from
mis-specification of the functional form. The groups of family and humanitarian only pass the RESET test.
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(TOT) (FAM) (EDUC) (WORK) (HUMAN) (OTH)
ln dist. −0.742∗∗∗ −0.912∗∗∗ −0.581∗∗∗ −0.680∗∗∗ −0.690∗∗∗ −0.509∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.102) (0.106) (0.119) (0.167) (0.121)
contig. 0.041 −0.146 −0.096 −0.058 −1.400∗∗∗ 0.732
(0.320) (0.287) (0.379) (0.464) (0.498) (0.454)
colony 1.044∗∗∗ 1.043∗∗∗ 1.885∗∗∗ 1.018∗∗∗ 1.193∗∗∗ 1.181∗∗∗
(0.349) (0.349) (0.441) (0.389) (0.428) (0.363)
com. lang. 1.122∗∗∗ 1.179∗∗∗ 1.074∗∗∗ 1.219∗∗∗ 0.420∗ 0.889∗∗∗
(0.161) (0.177) (0.183) (0.192) (0.225) (0.172)
com. leg. 0.463∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗ 0.526∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗ 0.573∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.095) (0.103) (0.113) (0.154) (0.107)
ln migr. stockt−1 0.216∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.001 0.098∗∗∗ 0.019 0.004
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.021) (0.016)
ln(empl.rate)ot −0.197∗∗∗ −0.121∗∗ 0.164∗∗ 0.045 −0.679∗∗∗ −0.131∗
(0.057) (0.060) (0.078) (0.075) (0.114) (0.073)
ln(empl.rate)dt 0.433∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗ −0.111 1.242∗∗∗ 0.148 1.089∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.114) (0.154) (0.181) (0.283) (0.203)
ln(pop. grt)ot −0.156∗∗∗ −0.167∗∗∗ −0.078∗∗∗ −0.187∗∗∗ −0.036 −0.053∗
(0.024) (0.028) (0.030) (0.036) (0.053) (0.032)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Destination dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Origin regional dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.587 0.581 0.423 0.503 0.287 0.452
Obs 14088 12155 8590 8966 5868 7519
10%, 5% and 1% levels of confidence indicated by ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the
country-pair level.
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(TOT) (FAM) (EDUC) (WORK) (HUMAN) (OTH)
ln dist. −1.082∗∗∗ −1.439∗∗∗ −1.098∗∗∗ −0.907∗∗∗ −0.107 −1.294∗∗∗
(0.261) (0.284) (0.393) (0.313) (0.280) (0.287)
contig. −0.675∗∗ −0.875∗∗ 0.105 −0.641∗ −1.482 −0.870
(0.337) (0.355) (0.537) (0.387) (1.221) (0.586)
colony 0.719∗∗∗ 0.640∗∗ 2.532∗∗∗ 0.051 1.591∗∗ −0.432
(0.248) (0.276) (0.320) (0.384) (0.755) (0.508)
com. lang. 2.095∗∗∗ 2.076∗∗∗ 2.373∗∗∗ 2.898∗∗∗ −0.022 2.547∗∗∗
(0.334) (0.356) (0.359) (0.481) (0.539) (0.556)
com. leg. −0.047 −0.250 0.272 0.666∗ −0.210 0.194
(0.219) (0.248) (0.223) (0.355) (0.470) (0.230)
ln migr. stockt−1 0.317∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.405∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.053) (0.040) (0.061) (0.083) (0.052)
ln(empl.rate)ot −0.475∗ −0.528∗ −0.827∗∗ −0.122 −0.649∗∗∗ 0.126
(0.259) (0.270) (0.364) (0.401) (0.197) (0.284)
ln(empl.rate)dt 1.136∗∗∗ 0.639∗∗ 0.390 0.273 1.319 3.443∗∗∗
(0.294) (0.298) (0.516) (0.704) (1.145) (0.544)
ln(pop. grt)ot −0.432∗∗∗ −0.330∗∗∗ −0.479∗∗∗ −0.511∗∗∗ −0.477∗∗∗ −0.533∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.096) (0.148) (0.132) (0.089) (0.130)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Destination dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Origin regional dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.716 0.718 0.846 0.447 0.409 0.800
Obs 17617 17759 17755 17621 17632 17754
10%, 5% and 1% levels of confidence indicated by ∗, ∗∗ and ∗ ∗ ∗ respectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the
country-pair level.
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WDI: World Development Indicator
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